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DEFERENCE TO THE AGENCY IS THE BEST 
POLICY: THE D.C. CIRCUIT APPLIES 
CHEVRON IN DENYING ADDITIONAL 
MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENTS TO 
PROVIDER HOSPITALS IN WASHINGTON 
REGIONAL MEDICORP 
Abstract: On December 29, 2015, in Washington Regional Medicorp v. Bur-
well, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) correctly interpreted the 
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”) in calculating 
Medicare reimbursements for a provider hospital based on the capped target 
amount from the previous year. In agreeing with the Secretary, the D.C. Cir-
cuit joined the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits in hold-
ing that the statute and its implementing regulations supported the Secretary. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in contrast, has held that the 
regulations unambiguously compel the contrary conclusion, namely, that the 
Secretary should base her calculation on a hospital-specific target amount. 
This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of TEFRA is the 
right one. It correctly applies the Chevron analysis, deferring to HHS, while 
also noting that HHS’s reading is the best one. In doing so, the D.C. Circuit 
also fulfills the congressional intent to transfer hospitals from a system of 
hospital-specific reimbursements to a decidedly more objective system of re-
imbursements. 
INTRODUCTION 
Comprising more than one tenth of the federal budget, Medicare is the 
federally administered program responsible for providing millions of elder-
ly and disabled Americans with health insurance.1 When provider hospitals 
treat Medicare patients, they are reimbursed by the Department of Health 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2012) (laying out the mechanics of the Medicare system and 
describing its general purpose); JULIETTE CUBANSKI & TRICIA NEUMAN, THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., THE FACTS ON MEDICARE SPENDING AND FINANCING 1 (2016) (noting that 
Medicare spending constitutes about fifteen percent of the federal budget as of 2015); Eleanor D. 
Kinney, In Search of Bureaucratic Justice—Adjudicating Medicare Home Health Benefits in the 
1980s, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 251, 253 (1990) (detailing the more than thirty million Americans 
enrolled in Medicare). 
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and Human Services (“HHS”).2 Hospitals are usually reimbursed according 
to the Prospective Payment System (“PPS”), through which each hospital 
receives a fixed amount per year for services rendered to Medicare pa-
tients.3 For many years, psychiatric hospitals constituted an exception to 
this rule, as they received reimbursements based on their reasonable actual 
costs.4 The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (“TEFRA”) of 1982 
defined the method for calculating the psychiatric hospitals’ reimbursement 
payments.5 
Not surprisingly, the courts are tasked with the interpretation of this 
Medicare reimbursement statute.6 In December 2015, in Washington Re-
gional Medicorp v. Burwell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit joined the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Sixth 
Circuits in holding that the governing statute and its corresponding regula-
tions supported the Secretary’s calculation of reimbursement payments.7 
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit suggested that the statute and regulations, 
even if ambiguous, were entitled to deference in accordance with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.8 Conversely, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395f (instructing the Department for Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 
to make such payments to providers of services, including hospitals); Wash. Reg’l Medicorp v. 
Burwell (Wash. Reg’l I), 72 F. Supp. 3d 159, 160 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 813 F.3d 357 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (observing how HHS reimburses hospitals for the services they offer to Medicare patients). 
 3 See Hardy Wilson Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius (Hardy Wilson II), 616 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 
2010) (describing the regulatory scheme governing Medicare reimbursements to provider hospi-
tals); Martin F. Grace & Jean M. Mitchell, Regulation of Health Care Costs: The Implications of 
the Prospective Payment Reimbursement System, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 128 (1989) 
(describing the Prospective Payment System (“PPS”) as the implementation of a more uniform sys-
tem of hospital reimbursement). 
 4 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(1) (defining actual costs in terms of the operating costs of a 
hospital’s inpatient services); Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
496 F. App’x 526, 528, 530 (6th Cir. 2012) (detailing the exclusion of psychiatric hospitals from the 
PPS during the years 1982 through 2005). 
 5 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 
324, 332–33 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww) (accounting for, among other things, 
routine operating costs, ancillary services, and special care unit costs in determining a hospital’s 
operating costs). 
 6 See Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331, 342 (1896) (declaring that the judiciary is the ultimate 
arbiter of statutory construction, even when an agency is charged with administering the statute); 
Wash. Reg’l I, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 163 (stating that the judiciary will first use the relevant tools of 
statutory construction before deferring to an agency’s interpretation). 
 7 See Wash. Reg’l Medicorp v. Burwell (Wash. Reg’l II), 813 F.3d 357, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the Secretary’s interpretation squared with the plain meaning of the statute); Mich. 
Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 496 F. App’x at 533 (holding that the plain language of the statute support-
ed the Secretary’s interpretation); Ancora Psychiatric Hosp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 417 F. App’x 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) (same). 
 8 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (requir-
ing deference to the agency when the relevant statute is either silent or ambiguous); Wash. Reg’l 
II, 813 F.3d at 362 (same). In fact, the D.C. Circuit declared it would uphold the Secretary’s inter-
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the Fifth Circuit, in Hardy Wilson Memorial Hospital v. Sebelius decided 
five years earlier in 2010, held that the regulations in question unambigu-
ously accorded with the hospital’s method of calculation.9 
This Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit reached the correct result 
by appropriately deferring to the administrative agency as required by 
Chevron and its progeny.10 This Comment further argues that the holding of 
the D.C. Circuit is consistent with congressional intent in passing Medicare 
reimbursement legislation.11 Part I of this Comment provides an overview 
of the legislative history surrounding Medicare reimbursements before dis-
cussing the factual and procedural history of Washington Regional Medi-
corp.12 Part II explores the split between the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Cir-
cuit when applying Chevron to the Medicare reimbursement statute and 
regulations.13 Lastly, Part III argues that the D.C. Circuit correctly held that 
the hospital was not entitled to higher reimbursement payments just because 
the statutory caps had expired.14 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENTS AND  
WASHINGTON REGIONAL MEDICORP 
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) is the com-
ponent of the HHS responsible for administering the Medicare program.15 
Through the CMS, hospitals are reimbursed for the services they provide to 
Medicare patients.16 In the past decade, dispute over the calculation of these 
reimbursements has resulted in numerous lawsuits.17 Section A of this Part 
                                                                                                                           
pretation even without Chevron deference because that interpretation was “the best interpretation of 
the statute.” Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 362. 
 9 See Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 460 (holding that the regulations clearly compelled the 
hospital’s interpretation because only one part of the regulations had expired at the end of 2002). The 
Fifth Circuit determined the statute was ambiguous but deferred to the Secretary’s interpretation 
under Chevron. Id. at 456, 458. 
 10 See infra notes 88–99 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 100–109 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–56 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 57–87 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 88–109 and accompanying text. 
 15 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 358 (identifying the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”) and its relation to HHS); Sam Halabi, The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010: Rulemaking in the Shadow of Incentive-Based Regulation, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 
141, 144 (2011), http://lawrecord.com/files/38_Rutgers_L_Rec_141.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6RZ-
9H9X] (noting the oversight role CMS exercises with respect to Medicare and Medicaid). 
 16 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 358 (explaining the role of CMS); CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL INPATIENT PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 4 (2016) 
(identifying how CMS determines the amounts of reimbursement payments to which provider 
hospitals are entitled). 
 17 See, e.g., Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 358 (describing a challenge brought by an inpatient 
psychiatric hospital to the method of calculation that the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
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traces the development of the Medicare reimbursements through the lens of 
an evolving federal statutory scheme and its corresponding regulations.18 
Section B of this Part summarizes the U.S. District Court for the District of 
the District of Columbia’s 2014 decision in Washington Regional Medicorp 
v. Burwell, while also discussing the means of interpreting the pertinent 
statutory scheme and its accompanying regulations.19 
A. History of Medicare Reimbursements 
To combat Medicare’s exorbitant hospital expenditures, Congress en-
acted TEFRA in 1982, directing the Secretary of HHS to draft a legislative 
proposal for PPS that would distribute a fixed amount to hospitals for total 
services rendered.20 In the interim, Congress imposed a system of limits on 
the annual rate of increase for reimbursements, which was based on a hospi-
tal’s reasonable costs.21 Under the interim plan, hospitals were reimbursed 
for their reasonable costs not exceeding a ceiling based on the hospital’s 
“target amount” for the given year.22 When the PPS was rolled out in 1983, 
psychiatric hospitals were excluded.23 Consequently, psychiatric hospitals 
continued to receive reimbursements under the interim plan, based on their 
reasonable actual costs, leading to substantial differences in reimbursement 
amounts.24 
                                                                                                                           
used); Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 496 F. App’x at 527 (deciding a case in which psychiatric 
hospitals sued the Secretary of HHS); Ancora Psychiatric Hosp., 417 F. App’x at 172 (same). 
 18 See infra notes 20–37 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 38–56 and accompanying text. 
 20 See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 
Stat. 324, 335 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 42) (requiring the Secretary to 
develop a plan for the transition from a reasonable costs system to a prospective payment system); 
see also S. REP. NO. 97-494, pt. 1, at 24 (1982) (noting that hospital spending outpaced inflation at 
an extraordinary rate over the previous decade, perhaps because of the shift in funding from pri-
vate resources to government programs like Medicare and Medicaid). 
 21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(1) (2012) (basing reimbursement on a hospital’s operating 
costs, provided that those operating costs are reasonable). 
 22 Id. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A); see Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Cover-
age and Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 17 
(1987) (observing that payment was originally linked to the amounts that providers charged). For 
the first year that a hospital reported its costs, this target amount was defined as the “allowable oper-
ating costs of inpatient hospital services” for the preceding year, plus an applicable percentage in-
crease. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A)(i). For all subsequent years, the target amount was defined in 
terms of the target amount for the preceding year, again plus an applicable percentage increase. Id. 
§ 1395ww(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
 23 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 359 (explaining that Congress decided to exclude certain 
types of hospitals, including psychiatric hospitals from the PPS). Congress decided to exclude 
psychiatric hospitals because they tend to serve disproportionate numbers of low-income earners. 
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(a)(1)(D)(2)(B). 
 24 See H. REP. NO. 105-149, at 1336 (1997) (suggesting that it was misguided to allow the 
excluded hospitals to receive reimbursements based on their reasonable actual costs, because a flat 
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In response to this discrepancy, Congress passed the Balanced Budget 
Act (“BBA”) in 1997, which applied to hospitals exempt from the PPS.25 
Under the BBA, target amounts for the years 1998 to 2002 could not exceed 
the seventy-fifth percentile of target amounts for all hospitals in the same 
class for the year of 1996.26 In 1999, Congress passed the Balanced Budget 
Refinement Act, which directed the Secretary to transition the psychiatric 
hospitals onto the PPS by 2002.27 The Secretary failed, however, to incorpo-
rate those hospitals until 2005.28 As a result, the Secretary continued to calcu-
late reimbursements for the years from 2002 to 2005 based on the BBA 
capped target amounts.29 
To effectuate the purposes of TEFRA, the Secretary promulgated regu-
lations beginning in 1982.30 These regulations detailed how a hospital’s tar-
get amount would be calculated under TEFRA for the first year and all sub-
sequent years until the PPS was implemented.31 In 1997, following the 
BBA’s passage, the Secretary amended the regulations for hospitals still 
calculating their target amounts with reference to the 1982 statute so as to 
incorporate the new cap scheme.32 Finally, in 2005, HHS amended the regu-
                                                                                                                           
price would have driven down costs by limiting the amounts of reimbursements available to simi-
larly situated excluded hospitals). 
 25 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(H)). The statute explicitly identifies psychiatric units as a distinct class of 
exempt hospitals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(H)(iv)(I). 
 26 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(H)(ii)(I) (requiring the Secretary to estimate the 1996 sev-
enty-fifth percentile for each class of hospitals). 
 27 Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) of 1999, Pub. 
L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501; see also Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 496 F. App’x at 529–30 
(describing generally the effect of the BBRA on previously exempt hospitals). 
 28 See TOMMY G. THOMPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROSPECTIVE 
PAYMENT SYSTEM FOR INPATIENT SERVICES IN PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS AND EXEMPT UNITS 24 
(2002) (explaining that defining objective patient characteristics with respect to psychiatric hospi-
tals is more challenging than it is for acute care hospitals). Objective patient characteristics help 
HHS to set a national rate under the PPS, and this rate will then apply across the board to all simi-
larly situated hospitals. Id. at 2. 
 29 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 360 (explaining that because the capped target amount was 
much smaller than the target amount based on actual costs, the target amount in 2003 was corre-
spondingly smaller than it would have been had the target amount been based on actual costs); see 
also Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2003 Rates, 
67 Fed. Reg. 49,982, 50,103–04 (Aug. 1, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 413) (clarifying 
that the target amount for 2003 would be based on the target amount from 2002, notwithstanding 
the expiration of the statutory caps). 
 30 See 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4) (2016) (detailing how to calculate the target amount). These 
regulations essentially mimicked the language of the federal statute. Id.; Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d 
at 359. 
 31 See 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(i)–(ii) (mirroring the language of the federal statute for the target 
amount for both the first year and all years thereafter); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii) 
(providing a definition of the target amount for the first year as well as all subsequent years). 
 32 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii). Under paragraph (c)(4)(iii), the hospital’s target amount was 
to be the lower of the amounts described in paragraphs (c)(4)(iii)(A) and (c)(4)(iii)(B). Id. Para-
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lations, specifying that the provision incorporating the cap scheme only ap-
plied from 1998 through 2002, but that the capped target amount from 2002 
could still be used to calculate the target amount for 2003.33 In that same 
year, HHS moved psychiatric hospitals to the PPS.34 
Under 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(i), the target amount is essentially equal to ac-
tual costs during the first cost reporting period.35 Then, in accordance with 42 
C.F.R. § 413.40(ii), the target amount for all subsequent years is equal to the 
target amount from the previous year, increased by a certain percentage.36 
Finally, 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(iii) applied during the years 1998 to 2002, forcing 
a hospital to select the lower of two numbers: the target amount based on ac-
tual costs and the target amount as limited by the BBA caps.37  
B. The District Court Addresses Medicare Reimbursements for the Gap 
Years in Washington Regional Medicorp v. Burwell 
Fayetteville Hospital, a psychiatric facility operated by Washington Re-
gional Medicorp, provided inpatient services to Medicare patients in 2003 
and 2004.38 At first, the fiscal intermediary responsible for calculating the 
reimbursement payments notified Fayetteville Hospital that it would be reim-
bursed based on an amount tied to its actual costs, rather than an amount that 
the BBA caps limited.39 The intermediary, however, subsequently altered its 
calculation and informed the hospital that its target amounts would now be 
calculated using the capped target amount from 2002.40 Upset with this re-
duced reimbursement calculation, the hospital appealed to the Provider Re-
                                                                                                                           
graph (c)(4)(iii)(A) described a hospital-specific amount, whereas paragraph (c)(4)(iii)(B) outlined 
the BBA cap amount for the years 1998 through 2002. Id. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii)(A)–(B). 
 33 See Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2006 
Rates, 70 Fed. Reg. 47,278, 47,464 (Aug. 12, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 413) (explain-
ing that the Secretary intended for the provision to expire after September 30, 2002, but that the 
target amount from 2002 would necessarily be used in calculating the target amount for 2003); see 
also 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii) (stating that this provision only applies from 1998 through 
2002). 
 34 See Prospective Payment System for Inpatient Psychiatric Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 66,922, 
66,922–24 (Nov. 15, 2004) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 413) (explaining that the move was 
delayed because of unanticipated complications in developing a PPS for psychiatric hospitals). 
 35 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(i) (tracking the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A)). 
 36 Id. § 413.40(c)(4)(ii) (tracking the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A)(ii)). 
 37 Id. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii) (tracking the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(H)). 
 38 Wash. Reg’l I, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 160. 
 39 Id. at 162. The fiscal intermediary seemed to assume that it should return to calculating the 
target amount under TEFRA, instead of relying on the target amount from 2002, the last year in 
which the BBA was in effect. See id. A fiscal intermediary is a private contractor whom the HHS 
hires to administer its Medicare reimbursement program. Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 496 F. 
App’x at 529 n.3. 
 40 Wash. Reg’l I, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 162. 
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imbursement Review Board.41 Following its hearing of the appeal, the Board 
approved the dispute for expedited judicial review.42 
Accordingly, Fayetteville filed this action in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia challenging the Secretary’s interpretation of the 
BBA.43 Fayetteville argued that HHS wrongly extended the BBA caps be-
yond 2002 by basing its 2003 target amount on the capped 2002 target 
amount.44 It maintained that HHS should have instead recalculated the hos-
pital-specific target amount for reimbursements for 2003 and 2004.45 
Relying on the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron, the district 
court analyzed the statute in two steps.46 According to Chevron, the court 
first asks if the statute is unambiguous with respect to the specific issue be-
ing litigated.47 If the statute is unambiguous, the court terminates its analy-
sis because it is obligated to enforce the plain meaning of the statute.48 If, 
however, there is ambiguity in the statute, the court gives deference to the 
interpretation of the statute that the agency advanced.49 It will not overturn 
the agency’s interpretation unless it is arbitrary or otherwise irrational.50 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. The Provider Reimbursement Review Board is the adjudicative body responsible for 
hearing any initial dispute concerning a hospital’s reimbursements. Kathleen A. Carrigan, Com-
ment, Administrative Law—Jurisdictional Authority of the Provider Reimbursement Review 
Board, 10 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 183, 184 (1988). 
 42 Wash. Reg’l I, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 162; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1) (2012) (granting 
providers the right to obtain judicial review when the Board determines that it has no authority to 
decide the question of law presented by the appeal). 
 43 Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 360. 
 44 See id. at 360–61 (arguing that HHS’s approach contradicted 42 U.S.C. § 1395(b)(3)(H) 
that implemented the BBA caps and limited the applicability of those caps to the years 1998 
through 2002). 
 45 Id. Fayetteville also contended that HHS committed a retroactive revision when it amended 
its regulations in 2005 by adding the language that limited 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii) to the 
years 1998 through 2002. Id. 
 46 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (explaining that a court must answer two questions when 
reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute); Wash. Regional I, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 163 (recit-
ing those same two questions). 
 47 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 48 See id. at 842–43 (suggesting that a statute is unambiguous if its meaning is clear); FEC v. 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 457 U.S. 27, 42–43 (1981) (implying that the court 
must overturn any administrative interpretation of a statute that conflicts with the plain language 
of the statute). 
 49 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpre-
tation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256 (1988) (reflecting 
on the novelty of the second step of the analysis and stressing that the interpretation of the statute 
then becomes an administrative duty, not a judicial one). Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
maintained that the court will not interject its own interpretation of the statute in cases of textual 
ambiguity. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 50 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984) (noting that 
the grounds for reversing an administrative interpretation of an ambiguous statute are generally 
limited to arbitrariness, irrationality, and capriciousness). 
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Courts use a different standard to determine when to defer to an agen-
cy’s interpretation of a regulation.51 In 1945, in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., the Supreme Court made clear that deference to an agency is owed 
when one of its regulations is ambiguous.52 In that situation, the Court will 
not overturn the agency’s interpretation unless it is patently erroneous.53 
Applying Chevron, the district court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of HHS.54 The court held that the Medicare statute unambiguously sup-
ported the Secretary’s reading of both the statute and her own regulations.55 
In the alternative, the district court found that the Secretary’s reading of the 
statute and her own regulations was reasonable, and therefore entitled to 
deference under Chevron.56 
II. CIRCUITS CONFLICT WHEN APPLYING CHEVRON IN THE MEDICARE 
REIMBURSEMENTS CONTEXT 
Since the delayed transition of provider hospitals to a Prospective 
Payment System in 2008, courts have drawn conflicting conclusions about 
whether the Medicare reimbursement statute and its accompanying regula-
tions are ambiguous as to the method of calculation.57 Washington Regional 
Medicorp v. Burwell, a 2015 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, represents the courts’ latest effort to settle this 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945) (interpreting a 
maximum price regulation in the wake of World War II). 
 52 See id. at 414 (deferring to agency expertise when the meaning of the regulation is in 
doubt). 
 53 See id. (insisting that the administrative interpretation is paramount when there is no plain 
meaning of the regulation that is at issue in the case). 
 54 See Wash. Reg’l I, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 164, 168. Observing the circuit split on the issue, the 
court declined to accept the analysis of the Fifth Circuit and instead applied the analysis of the Third 
and Sixth Circuits. Id. at 163–64. Compare Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 496 F. App’x at 533 (decid-
ing that the statute was unambiguous), and Ancora Psychiatric Hosp., 417 Fed App’x at 175 (same), 
with Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 460 (ruling that the statute was ambiguous). 
 55 Wash. Reg’l I, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 165 (reciting the first step under Chevron and finding that it 
was satisfied in this case); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (holding that the first step in review-
ing an agency’s interpretation of a statute is deciding whether the statute unambiguously addresses 
the question raised by the case). 
 56 See Wash. Reg’l I, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 165. The district court also rejected the claim that 
HHS’s amendment amounted to a retroactive revision. Id. at 167. The district court viewed the 
amendment as a mere clarification of the temporal limits on 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii). Id. 
Thus, it was not a substantive change to the regulations. Id. at 168. But see Hardy Wilson II, 616 
F.3d at 461 (holding that the amendment was a substantive change). 
 57 Compare Chalmette Med. Ctr., Inc., v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-cv-
4027, 2009 WL 2488265, at *1, *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 11, 2009) (holding that the statute unambigu-
ously dictated that the Secretary use the capped amount from 2002 to calculate the target amount 
for 2003), with Ark. State Hosp. v. Leavitt, No. 07-cv-624, 2008 WL 4531714, at *1, *4 (E.D. 
Ark. Oct. 8, 2008) (holding that the statute was fairly ambiguous as to how target amounts would 
be calculated after 2002). 
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issue of statutory interpretation.58 Before the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Washington Regional, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, and 
Sixth Circuits entertained challenges to the Secretary’s interpretation of the 
Medicare reimbursement statute and its guiding regulations.59 Section A of 
this Part reviews the Fifth Circuit’s 2010 decision in Hardy Wilson Memori-
al Hospital v. Sebelius, which concluded that the regulation unambiguously 
directed the Secretary to use hospital-specific amounts in calculating reim-
bursements for 2003 to 2005.60 Section B of this Part summarizes the out-
come in the D.C. Circuit, which diverged from that of the Fifth Circuit.61 
A. Fifth Circuit: Regulations Unambiguously Support  
Hospital’s Interpretation 
In 2010, in Hardy Wilson Memorial Hospital, the Fifth Circuit held that 
the Medicare reimbursement regulations promulgated by the Secretary actual-
ly directed her to use hospital-specific target amounts, not capped amounts, in 
calculating reimbursement payments for provider hospitals.62 This case con-
cerned five acute care hospitals, all of which contained psychiatric units in 
their facilities.63 Their reimbursements for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005 
were based on the capped amounts used between 1998 and 2002.64 Accord-
ingly, they received much lower payments than they would have received if 
the Secretary had used the hospital-specific target amounts for those years.65 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See Wash. Reg’l Medicorp v. Burwell (Wash. Reg’l II), 813 F.3d 357, 361–62 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
 59 See Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 496 F. App’x 526, 
541 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that statute and regulations unambiguously required the Secretary to 
use the capped amounts in calculating the target amounts after 2002); Ancora Psychiatric Hosp. v. 
Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 417 F. App’x 171, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (same); 
Hardy Wilson Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius (Hardy Wilson II), 616 F.3d 449, 460 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that regulations plainly commanded the Secretary to use hospital-specific amounts to 
calculate the target amounts after 2002). 
 60 See infra notes 62–74 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 75–87 and accompanying text. 
 62 See 616 F.3d at 460–61 (holding that the Secretary’s interpretation was not entitled to def-
erence because the regulation was unambiguous); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (observing that deference is not 
triggered when the plain meaning of a text is clear). 
 63 Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 452. An acute care hospital is defined as “a short term care 
hospital in which the average length of patient stay is less than thirty days . . . .” 29 C.F.R. 
§ 103.30(f)(2) (2016). An acute care hospital does not lose its acute care status if it provides psychiat-
ric care. Id. 
 64 Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 453. The capped amounts were equivalent to the seventy-fifth 
percentile of the target amount for hospitals in the same class as the plaintiff hospitals. Id. 
 65 Id. In fact, as the table provided by the Fifth Circuit demonstrates, the payments based on 
the capped amounts were less than half of the payments based on the hospital-specific amounts. 
Id. 
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The hospitals sought review of the decision in the district court, where the 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.66 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first reasoned that the Medicare reimburse-
ment statute was ambiguous as to how reimbursement payments should be 
calculated during the gap years of 2003 through 2005.67 Given this ambiguity, 
the court then deferred to the Secretary’s interpretation in accordance with 
Chevron.68 From the court’s perspective, using the capped amounts to calcu-
late reimbursement payments was not unreasonable because the statute stated 
that the target amount for each year was to be based on the target amount 
from the previous year.69 As a result, the court upheld the Secretary’s interpre-
tation because it drew on the statutory language defining the phrase “target 
amount” for both the first year and all subsequent years.70 
Moving to the related issue of regulatory interpretation, the Fifth Cir-
cuit next held that the Medicare reimbursement regulations unambiguously 
required the Secretary to use the hospital-specific target amounts when cal-
culating reimbursement payments for 2003 through 2005.71 At the outset, 
the court noted that the target amounts mentioned in the two provisions of 
the initial regulation were subject to the two provisions of the newer regula-
tion implementing the statutory caps.72 Next, the court observed that only 
the second provision of this newer regulation had expired at the end of 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. at 454. The court pointed out that summary judgment was proper both because there 
was no genuine issue of material fact and because statutory interpretation is a pure question of 
law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 454 (applying the summary judgment 
standard). 
 67 See Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 457 (pointing out that the statute was silent on the issue 
concerning the gap years). The court pointed to the contrasting interpretations that the Secretary 
and hospitals offered, deeming both interpretations “plausible.” Id. at 456. Given the availability of 
two reasonable interpretations of the statute, the court necessarily concluded that the statute was 
ambiguous. Id. at 457; see also United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 345 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing a 
statute as ambiguous when it admits of two reasonable interpretations). 
 68 Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 458; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (explaining that if the statute is silent or ambiguous in regard to the 
particular issue, the court should defer to the administrative agency’s interpretation, provided that 
the interpretation is based on an acceptable reading of the statute). 
 69 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2012); Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 458. The Fifth Cir-
cuit explained that it could not reverse the Secretary’s interpretation unless her interpretation was 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 458 (quot-
ing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
 70 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii); see Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 458 (noting that the 
Secretary’s interpretation logically followed from the text of the statute and was thus a permissible 
interpretation of said statute). 
 71 See Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 460 (holding that the Secretary’s interpretation warranted 
no deference because the regulation was unambiguous). 
 72 See id. at 459 (highlighting the language in each regulatory provision); 42 C.F.R. § 413. 40 
(c)(4)(i)–(iii) (2016) (using a preamble to make clear that (c)(4)(i) and (c)(4)(ii) were subject to 
(c)(4)(iii)). 
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2002.73 Because the first provision remained intact, the target amounts for 
2003 through 2005 were subject to that provision, meaning that the hospi-
tal-specific target amounts should be used to calculate the reimbursement 
payments for those years, against the Secretary’s contention.74 
B. Deferring to Agency Interpretations in the Statutory and Regulatory 
Contexts: The D.C. and Sixth Circuits 
The D.C. Circuit’s later decision in Washington Regional contradicted 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hardy Wilson Memorial Hospital.75 Although 
the D.C. Circuit seemed to agree with the Fifth Circuit as to the statute, it 
clearly disagreed as to the regulations.76 
On appeal in Washington Regional, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the dis-
trict court’s Chevron analysis.77 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s holding in both respects.78 It concluded that the plain language of 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 460 (contrasting (c)(4)(iii)(A) and (c)(4)(iii)(B)). As the 
court clarified, 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii)(A) was not restricted to specific years. Id. Section 
413.40(c)(4)(iii)(B), however, was limited to the years 1998 through 2002. Id.; 42 C.F.R. § 413.40
(c)(4)(iii)(B). 
 74 Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 460. The court also rejected the Secretary’s attempt in 2005 to 
clarify the time limits by asserting that all of 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii) expired on October 1, 
2002. Id. at 461. The court concluded by chiding the Secretary for imposing a retroactive revision on 
the regulatory text. See id. (quoting Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 486 (7th Cir. 1993)) (maintaining 
that the Secretary is obligated to abide by her regulations until she changes them). 
 75 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 365 (holding in favor of the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services); infra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. 
 76 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 364 (rejecting the argument that the regulations unambigu-
ously dictated used of the hospital-specific target amounts after 2002); infra notes 81–87 and ac-
companying text. 
 77 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 358 (holding that the Secretary’s reading of the controlling 
statute and regulation was not only reasonable but also the best reading). Fayetteville Hospital 
raised two main arguments on appeal: (1) the controlling statute and regulations unambiguously 
directed the Secretary to use the hospital-specific target amount when calculating reimbursements 
and (2) the Secretary retroactively revised the regulations in contravention of the plain text. Id. at 
360–61. The law usually does not approve of retroactive rulemaking. See, e.g., Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (noting the Court’s distaste for retroactive 
revisions). 
 78 Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363–65. Writing for a unanimous panel, Senior Circuit Judge 
David Sentelle reasoned that the most straightforward reading of the statute instructed the Secre-
tary to base each year’s target amount on the target amount from the previous year. Id. at 362–63; 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A)(ii) (providing that the target amount for the present year must 
be based on the target amount from the previous year). Accordingly, the Secretary based the target 
amount for 2003 on the capped target amount from 2002. Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 362; see also 
Ancora Psychiatric Hosp., 417 Fed App’x at 176 (emphasizing the interplay between (b)(3)(H) 
and (b)(3)(A)(ii)). As to the regulation, Judge Sentelle observed that its language regarding the 
target amount was similarly straightforward. See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 364 (quoting the 
regulatory language); 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(ii) (“[F]or subsequent cost reporting periods, the 
target amount equals the hospital's target amount for the previous cost reporting period increased 
by the update factor . . . .”). 
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the statute supported the Secretary’s reading.79 Without deciding the issue 
of ambiguity, the D.C. Circuit accepted the Secretary’s reading because her 
reading represented a reasonable interpretation of the statute.80  
Turning to the regulations, the D.C. Circuit deferred to the Secretary’s 
interpretation.81 The court made clear, however, that even without defer-
ence, it would uphold the Secretary’s interpretation.82 In light of its agree-
ment with the Secretary, the D.C. Circuit further reasoned that the amend-
ment presented no retroactivity problem because it only clarified the time 
limit associated with the BBA caps.83 
Similarly, in Michigan Department of Community Health v. Secretary 
of Health and Human Services in 2012, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Hardy Wilson because using a hospital-specific target 
amount would subvert Congress’s intent by restoring a reimbursement sys-
tem tied to hospital-specific costs.84 More relevant to the D.C. Circuit’s de-
cision, the Sixth Circuit also held that the Secretary’s interpretation of her 
regulations was acceptable because no other interpretation necessarily fol-
lowed from the text.85 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit observed that deference 
to the Secretary’s interpretation of her regulations was especially appropri-
ate in a case implicating Medicare because the program is so detailed and 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 362–63. 
 80 See id. at 362 (“HHS’s interpretation is not only reasonable but also the best interpretation 
of the statute.”). In reaching this conclusion, Judge Sentelle emphasized that deference to a rea-
sonable administrative interpretation is especially appropriate in the Medicare context because of 
the extreme complexity inherent in the statute. Id.; see also Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. 
Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (advising that heightened complexity in the Medi-
care statute should result in heightened deference by the court). 
81 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (stressing the importance of administrative 
deference in the regulatory context); Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (rejecting the argument that 
the regulations compelled the hospital’s reading). 
 82 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (suggesting that deference was important, but ultimate-
ly besides the point, and intimating that the Secretary interpreted the statute correctly). 
 83 Id. at 364–65; see also Ne. Hosp. Corp. v. Sebelius, 657 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (con-
trasting a clarification with a substantive change, and explaining that only a substantive change is 
impermissibly retroactive). 
 84 See 496 F. App’x at 535–36 (criticizing the Fifth Circuit for its decision to find ambiguity 
in the statute despite Congress’s obvious decision to abandon a system of hospital-specific reim-
bursements); Hardy Wilson II, 616 F.3d at 457 (stating that the statute was ambiguous because 
neither side could demonstrate a clear congressional intent in the wording of the statute). 
 85 Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 496 F. App’x at 540. The court explained that the Secretary 
acted reasonably in relying on 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(ii) to calculate the reimbursements be-
cause 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii) no longer served a purpose after the statutory caps expired. Id. 
at 540–41; see also Progressive Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 970 F.2d 188, 192–93 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (advising that a regulation should be interpreted in a manner consistent with its statuto-
ry predecessor). 
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intricate.86 Following this logic, the D.C. Circuit in Washington Regional 
agreed that the Secretary’s interpretation, which is owed considerable defer-
ence in the regulatory context, was the best one available.87 
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED CHEVRON AND THUS GAVE 
EFFECT TO THE UNAMBIGUOUS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
In 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, following the logic of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and 
Sixth Circuits, correctly held in Washington Regional Medicorp v. Burwell 
that the Medicare reimbursement statute and regulations supported the Sec-
retary’s interpretation.88 Section A of this Part argues that the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Washington Regional reflects an appropriately deferential appli-
cation of Chevron analysis.89 Next, Section B of this Part argues that the 
holding is also in accord with the congressional intent to transfer hospitals 
from a system of hospital-specific reimbursements to a more objective sys-
tem of reimbursements.90 
A. The Enduring Importance of Agency Deference 
First, the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion reflects an appropriately deferential 
application of Chevron analysis.91 For step one, the D.C. Circuit seemed to 
concede the existence of some ambiguity in the statute with regard to the 
specific issue of how to calculate Medicare reimbursements.92 As a result, 
the D.C. Circuit deferred to the Secretary, deeming her position to be rea-
                                                                                                                           
 86 Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 496 F. App’x at 541; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. 
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (noting that deference is particularly apt when the program 
involved in the case is incredibly complex and highly specialized). 
 87 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (concluding that the Secretary put forth a better inter-
pretation); see also Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 (1945) (determining 
that the administrative interpretation of a maximum price regulation clarified any possible uncer-
tainty about the meaning of that regulation). 
 88 See Wash. Reg’l Medicorp v. Burwell (Wash. Reg’l II), 813 F.3d 357, 358 (D.C. Cir. 
2015); Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 496 F. App’x 526, 527 
(6th Cir. 2012); Ancora Psychiatric Hosp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 417 
F. App’x 171, 172 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 89 See infra notes 91–99 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 100–109 and accompanying text. 
 91 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (holding that the best reading of the statute was the one 
that the Secretary adopted); cf. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that, 
under Chevron, the judicial task is over if the court finds a plain and unambiguous meaning in the 
statute). 
 92 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 362 (holding that the most obvious interpretation of the 
statute, notwithstanding any ambiguity, squared with that of the Secretary); see also Scalia, supra 
62, at 520 (arguing that Chevron has meaning only when congressional intent is found to be am-
biguous). 
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sonable.93 Here, the D.C. Circuit showed that deferring to the agency is of-
tentimes the court’s role, especially when there is at least a colorable argu-
ment in favor of textual ambiguity.94 Rather than abdicate the judicial role, 
the D.C. Circuit simply recognized the enduring importance of deference to 
the agency in an increasingly administrative state.95 
The deference of the D.C. Circuit was still more pronounced in its in-
terpretation of the regulations.96 The court specifically alluded to the need 
for heightened deference in the administrative context, especially in light of 
the complexities of Medicare.97 It also noted that the Secretary had consist-
ently adhered to her interpretation of the regulations.98 Accordingly, the 
D.C. Circuit had little difficulty in deferring to the Secretary’s reading of 
her own regulations.99 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 362 (conflating somewhat the two-step analysis); Mich. 
Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 496 F. App’x at 536 (noting that, assuming that ambiguity exists in the 
statute, the court would still affirm summary judgment on behalf of the Secretary because of her 
reasonable interpretation). 
 94 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) 
(stressing that the court defers to a reasonable interpretation of the agency if Congress has not spoken 
to the issue raised by the litigants); Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 362–63 (concluding that HHS’s inter-
pretation was better than the hospital’s, while assuming the existence of some ambiguity in the gov-
erning statute); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 
298 (1986) (arguing that judicial review coincides with the administrative reality under Chevron). 
 95 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 362 (examining the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1395
ww(b)(3)(A) and 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(H) in order to determine whether the Secretary’s 
reading had some basis in the statute); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); 
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1983) 
(pointing out that, even in administrative cases, a court should still say both what the law means 
and what it does not mean). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A) (2012) (referring to the target 
amount prior to 1998), with id. § 1395ww(b)(3)(H) (defining target amount since 1998 with refer-
ence to the BBA caps). 
 96 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (referring to Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 
(1997), a case involving deference to an agency’s own regulations); see also Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding that the administrative construction of a 
regulation is of “controlling weight”). 
 97 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 362 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 
504, 512 (1994)). 
 98 See id. at 363–64 (pointing out that the Secretary had always abided by this particular in-
terpretation of the relevant regulations); cf. Scalia, supra note 62, at 518 (noting that an agency 
cannot suddenly change its interpretation during, or perhaps because of, litigation). 
 99 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (“With or without deference, we conclude that HHS’s 
interpretation is the better one . . . .”); see also Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414 (deferring to the agency, 
unless its interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”). 
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B. The Secretary’s Interpretation of the Statute Best Effectuates 
Congressional Intent in Amending the Medicare  
Reimbursement Statute 
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit was correct to uphold the Secretary’s in-
terpretation of the statute as allowing targets set in accord with the 2002 
targets, because that reading best comported with congressional intent.100 
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit reviewed Congress’s intent as a way of confirming 
the Secretary’s reading of the statute.101 In its review, the D.C. Circuit em-
phasized how Congress repeatedly amended the Medicare reimbursement 
statute in its effort to inject objectivity into the calculation of reimbursement 
payments.102 In 1998, Congress imposed the statutory caps on reimburse-
ment payments for psychiatric hospitals because there was too much of a 
discrepancy from one hospital to the next.103 Although these caps were 
meant to elapse at the end of 2002, Congress never intended to revert to a 
reimbursement system based on hospital-specific data.104 Rather, Congress 
expected for the hospitals to enter the Prospective Payment System at the 
end of 2002.105 When the Secretary failed to establish a PPS for psychiatric 
hospitals by 2002, the statute suggested that the target amount for the cur-
rent year should continue to be based on the capped target amount from the 
previous year so as to prevent excessive reimbursement payments.106 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 362–63 (disagreeing with the hospital’s argument that the 
Secretary contradicted congressional intent); see also Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. 
Sebelius, 650 F.3d 685, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (commenting on Congress’s repeated attempts to miti-
gate the rise in Medicare costs for provider hospitals); Starr, supra note 94, at 295 (noting that the 
court may look to congressional intent in deciphering whether there is a plain meaning of the stat-
utory language). 
 101 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2491–92 (2015) (ruling that a provision of the Af-
fordable Care Act was ambiguous precisely because the most literal reading of the statute una-
voidably thwarted congressional intent); Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (remarking on Congress’s 
persistent efforts to control overly expensive treatment that particular hospitals provided). 
 102 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (discussing Congress’s effort to shift the provider hos-
pitals from a reimbursement system based on actual costs to one guided by more objective and uni-
form criteria); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(H) (2012) (demonstrating the shift with the 
implementation of statutory caps beginning in 1998). 
 103 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 359 (describing the consequences of excluding psychiatric 
hospitals from the PPS); H.R. REP. NO. 105-149, at 1336 (identifying the “significant variation” in 
hospital costs among hospitals exempted from the PPS as a reason for imposing the statutory caps). 
 104 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (concluding that there was no evidence Congress de-
sired for the Secretary to revive the method of calculation based on hospitals’ actual costs); H.R. 
REP. NO. 105-149, at 1336 (citing the rapid growth in reimbursement payments to exempt hospi-
tals as a reason to revamp the payment system). 
 105 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 360 (noting that the Secretary was unable to start the tran-
sition until 2005); THOMPSON, supra note 28, at 46 (admitting to Congress that the Secretary 
would not be able to meet the 2002 deadline). 
 106 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(A) (basing the target amount for every year after the first 
year on the target amount from the year prior, thus suggesting that each year acts as a limitation on 
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Similarly, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Secretary’s understand-
ing of the regulations best fulfilled the congressional intent.107 Because the 
Secretary added the provision at issue to implement the statutory caps, it 
would defy Congress’s clearly expressed intent to apply that provision be-
yond the period lasting from 1998 through 2002.108 Accordingly, the D.C. 
Circuit held that the provision did not apply in 2003 or 2004, thereby pre-
venting Fayetteville Hospital from circumventing congressional intent in 
the calculation of its target amounts for those years.109 
CONCLUSION 
In 2015, in Washington Regional Medicorp v. Burwell, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit correctly ruled that the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services calculated Medicare reimbursement payments to pro-
vider hospitals in accordance with the terms of the applicable statute and 
regulations, joining the Third and Sixth Circuits. In correctly holding in fa-
vor of the Secretary’s interpretation, the D.C. Circuit applied Chevron in an 
appropriately deferential fashion. As a continuing sign of respect in an in-
creasingly administrative state, courts should imitate the approach of the 
D.C. Circuit. This approach involves a willingness to defer to the agency, 
provided that the statute and regulations are not absolutely clear. In addi-
tion, the method of calculation employed by the Secretary accurately re-
flects the congressional intent to move hospitals from a system of hospital-
specific reimbursements to the Prospective Payment System based on more 
objective and nationalized characteristics. 
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the subsequent year); Ancora Psychiatric Hosp., 417 F. App’x at 176 (describing how the capped 
target amounts would exert an “echo” effect on the target amounts for subsequent years, but main-
taining that this effect was not contrary to congressional intent because Congress wanted to limit 
psychiatric hospitals’ reimbursable costs). 
 107 See 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii) (2016) (limiting use of the capped target amount to the 
period starting in 1998 and ending in 2002); see also Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363 (reasoning 
that paragraph (c)(4)(iii) was added to the regulations with the intention of implementing the statu-
tory caps). 
 108 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 363–64 (holding that paragraph (c)(4)(iii) only applied so 
long as the statutory caps remained in effect); Mich. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 496 F. App’x at 541 
(emphasizing that the Secretary had twice declared that paragraph (c)(4)(iii) would expire at the 
end of 2002); Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 
604 (1996) (suggesting that the text of a statute or regulation may provide the best evidence of 
congressional intent). 
 109 See Wash. Reg’l II, 813 F.3d at 364 (refusing to apply 42 C.F.R. § 413.40(c)(4)(iii) in 
calculating target amounts for 2003 and 2004); cf. Progressive Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United 
States, 970 F.2d 188, 192 (6th Cir. 1992) (observing that the district court had erroneously inter-
preted a regulation so as to conflict with its statute, contravening congressional intent as a result). 
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